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cross India, a number of
studies, coupled with
practical experience on the
ground, have shown that
many urban and rural communities
are willing to pay for social
infrastructure such as water and
sanitation. Figure 1 illustrates the
results of a 1996 survey in Dehradun
which clearly shows that a high
percentage of households are willing
to pay more than the current tariff for
an improved water supply service.
There is growing evidence
that many urban and rural
communities are willing to
pay more than the
prevailing rates for water
and sanitation, to ensure a
better or more reliable
service. However,
governments seem
unwilling to match this with
a willingness to charge
consumers for these
services and the result is a
continuing cycle of low
revenues, high costs,
unsatisfactory services and
financial crisis. Despite
evidence from a range of
thorough and well
designed surveys to assess
willingness to pay, this
resistance to increasing
tariffs persists. This Field
Note explores the
approaches to assessing
willingness to pay,
examines the evidence of
previous willingness-to-
pay surveys carried out in
India and takes a critical
look at the experience of
such surveys in influencing
policy change. Clearly,
carrying out good surveys
is not enough and more
efforts need to be made in
building capacity for
effective policy
development.
But the authorities in Dehradun
have not responded to the evidence
of this survey by increasing the tariffs
to capture the potential additional
revenues it has revealed.
Policy makers frequently refrain
from raising tariff rates fearing that
the people will not want to pay.
Credible estimates of willingness to
pay and other means of assessing
demand could be used to demonstrate
that the people are already paying
much more than the official tariff rate
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80 per cent of households are willing to pay more than the prevailing tariff
10 per cent of households are willing to pay up to Rs 6.25 more per month
through informal channels and coping
strategies, and that they would be willing
to pay the government even more to
secure better services.  If policy makers
can establish what households are willing
to pay, they should be able to:
l revise tariffs to capture this willingness
to pay;
l plan future investment keeping in mind
what consumers really want; and
l move towards financial sustainability
and independence.
A Survey Of Recent Experience
Willingness to pay is not
matched by willingness to
charge
The Water and Sanitation Program
 South Asia recently commissioned
a study to evaluate the range of
experience of willingness-to-pay
research in India and to explore and
determine the impact of willingness-
to-pay studies on water and
sanitation policy in both rural and
urban India. The study looked at 17
major willingness-to-pay exercises carried
out in India, of which eight were in the
water supply and sanitation sector.
Overall, the study found that experience in
the use of willingness to pay techniques
was limited, with only seven India-based
researchers cited as having the experience
required to carry out contingent valuation
surveys to an international standard.
However, experience can be built and the
comparatively small base of expertise
available in the country today would not
be a major impediment to a more
widespread use of these techniques if their
value were widely recognised. Much more
worrying is the lack of impact that these
studies have had on policy in their
respective locations.
To explore the linkage between the
studies and policy, consultants carried out
field visits to locations where four studies
had been conducted  in rural Kerala
(1988), rural Punjab (1996), the city of
Baroda (1995) and the city of Dehradun
(1996).
All four studies revealed that
households were willing to pay
significantly higher amounts than the
current tariffs for improved service. Yet,
there was little relationship between these
studies and policy reform.
Baroda City
The study conducted in Baroda in 1995
was commissioned by the Human
Settlements Management Institute (HSMI)
of the Housing and Urban Development
Corporation (HUDCO).  The purpose of
the study was to evaluate a tariff revision
proposed by the Baroda Municipal
Corporation (BMC). This revision in tariff
was intended to raise finances to pay off a
HUDCO loan of Rs 470 million, part of its
Rs 660 million water supply augmentation
programme.
The study, which was of a high technical
standard, found that households were
generally willing to pay up to 3.4 times
more than the tariff rates proposed by the
BMC and that they were currently paying
even more than this amount in coping
costs. However, although the BMC raised
its rates in February 1996, this increase
was much below that recommended by
the study. The increase appeared to have
been prompted more by the election of a
new Board in the BMC, after some years of
Presidents Rule, during which time tariffs
had not been increased. Raising the tariff
was in any case a condition for the loan to
the BMC from HUDCO. In fact, the study
findings were never presented to the
Standing Committee and the board of the
BMC, who pass all resolutions relating to
tariff. This study could have been used to
People are already
paying much more
than the official
tariff rate through
informal channels
and coping
strategies, and
they would be
willing to pay the
government even
more to secure
better services
A range of techniques are available to measure what households are willing to pay
for services such as drinking water and sanitation. Two commonly used techniques are
the revealed preference method and the contingent valuation method.
Revealed Preference surveys show what households are currently paying for these
services. In the case of water supply, this expenditure consists of payment of the official
tariff as well as investments made to improve the quality and quantity of supply,
including storage tanks and additional pipes, booster pumps, water filters and purifiers.
Contingent Valuation surveys reveal what households are willing to pay for
improvements in service. It uses a set of carefully designed future scenarios, usually
drawn from actual augmentation plans, to show people what benefits they can get
from each type of system, and then asks them how much they would pay for these
benefits.
The consequences of unreliability (in terms of lost productivity, and negative health
impacts) can also give an indirect measure of the demand for water from households
and presents an alternative to willingness-to-pay studies.
The Contingent Valuation Method
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is the most comprehensive technique
developed so far for measuring willingness to pay, and is preferred by economists
because of its more rigorous theoretical basis. Economists believe that contingent
valuation studies have the following advantages over other techniques:
l Being based on actual face-to-face surveys, they provide proof for political and
administrative decision makers that consumers, including the poor, are willing to pay
for better services.
l The method can measure the amount households are willing to pay in a range of
alternative scenarios, enabling policy makers to assess, for example, whether people
are more willing to pay for increased reliability, better quality or more hours of supply.
The details of household demand thus revealed can be incorporated into technical and
financial plans for future augmentation.
l Since the technique uses hypothetical scenarios, it can provide estimates of
household willingness to pay even for systems which do not currently exist.
l Since household willingness to pay is based on the perceived benefits from
alternative scenarios, cumulative willingness to pay may be much higher than the total
costs of providing the actual system. This disparity, if it is subsequently exploited, can
generate additional revenue to fund cross-subsidies or further service improvements.
However, all willingness-to-pay studies take time and cost money and contingent
valuation surveys are notoriously expensive and difficult to conduct. The UKs
Department for International Development (DFID), for example, has estimated that a
contingent valuation method study will cost anything from Rs 3 to Rs 10 million. It
would seem risky therefore to carry out such studies without adequate supervision and
without an explicit planned linkage to future policy developments and investment
decisions. Surprisingly, however, this is exactly what seems to have happened in a
number of cases.
How To Assess Household Willingness To Pay (WTP)
promote a considered tariff increase, or as
a public relations tool to improve the
acceptability of the increases actually
implemented, but it was not, and now
serves only to justify ex-poste an increase
which seems to have been inevitable.
Dehradun City
The results of this study, which was
commissioned by the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID),
were presented at a workshop in the city,
which was attended by top executives of
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the Dehradun Water Works
Department and the Garhwal Jal
Sansthan (Garhwal Regional Water
Management Agency). While the
study sent a clear message that there
was willingness amongst domestic
consumers to pay more for improved
services, no tariff policy changes
resulted. This may have been for at
least three reasons.
Firstly, tariff rates had been
increased before the study, in
December 1994, but with no change
in the quality of supply. While urban
residential consumers reluctantly paid up,
hoteliers from the nearby resort towns of
Nainital and Mussoorie protested,
claiming that the seasonal tourist demand
was insufficient to pay increased tariffs for
the entire year. The policy was reversed,
and the government directed that the
excess tariff collected under the new rates
be refunded.
Secondly, Dehradun falls within the
proposed new state of Uttaranchal, and it
seems likely that the government of Uttar
Pradesh was reluctant to make large fresh
investments there at the time.
Finally, despite the worsening financial
situation, the Jal Sansthan has been able
to augment water supply to the city of
Dehradun. While additional funds are
required to pay outstanding administration
and operational costs, given the previous
experience with tariff increases, the Jal
Sansthan is relying more on cross-
subsidisation from other funding sources.
Ultimately, the Dehradun study appears
to have been commissioned in something
of a vacuum, with little ownership by key
decision makers and little reference to the
prevailing atmosphere of frustration with a
previous tariff increase which had not led
to improved services. It therefore failed as
a tool for tariff revision.
Rural Punjab
A willingness-to-pay study was carried
out in 1996 in villages of two districts in
Punjab, commissioned by the Public
Health Engineering Department (PHED) of
the Government of Punjab. The study
findings were intended to contribute to the
design of a tariff policy for a World Bank-
funded scheme to augment rural water
supplies. Once again the study indicated a
Studies have shown that:
l In Dehradun, in 1996, consumers were willing to pay more than twice the prevailing
tariff (average households were willing to pay up to Rs 4.50 per cubic metre for a
continuous water supply as compared to the prevailing rate of Rs 2.00 per cubic metre for
the existing intermittent supply).  What is more, the study revealed that, on average,
households were already paying up to Rs 10 per cubic metre in coping costs arising from
the irregularity and unreliability of the supply.
l In Baroda, in 1995, households with incomes below Rs 1,500 per month were willing to
pay up to Rs 275 per annum for a reliable service (as against prevailing payments of about
Rs 43) while wealthier families with monthly incomes between Rs 4,500 to 6,000 were
willing to pay up to Rs 440 (as against prevailing payments of around Rs 200).
l In rural Kerala, in 1988, consumers who were already paying Rs 5 per month for the
existing service were willing to increase this to Rs 20 without any requirement for service
improvements, and were willing to pay a further Rs 5 per month for improved services.
l In Delhi, in 1998, households could pay anything up to Rs 2,000 per year in direct and
indirect costs to cope with the irregularity and unreliability of existing supplies. This potential
source of revenue is not captured by the formal providers, but paid directly to unregulated
small scale private sector interests.
How Much Are Consumers Willing To Pay?
While the study
sent a clear
message that there
was willingness
amongst domestic
consumers to pay
more for improved
services, no tariff
policy changes
resulted
wide-spread interest in improved service
levels, accompanied by a willingness to
pay more.
However, towards the close of the study
the Government of Punjab declared a
populist policy of free water and
consequently no policy revision for the
proposed project could take place. The
World Bank subsequently suspended its
offer to fund the project as cost recovery
formed a major plank of the proposed
reform package attached to the project.
Once again, government policy decisions
had failed to respond to the findings of a
study which clearly indicated peoples
willingness to pay for water.
Rural Kerala
In 1988 a World Bank team conducted
a rigorous willingness-to-pay study in rural
north Kerala.  The study indicated a
widespread willingness to pay increased
tariffs for water supply. Since then, there
have been three changes in tariff rates. In
1991, the prevailing system of differential
rates was replaced with a uniform
minimum tariff of Rs 1.00 per 1,000 litres.
In 1993, this was raised to Rs 1.50. With
this announcement, the Government of
Kerala also agreed to an annual increase
of 15 per cent in the minimum uniform
tariff. However, after the next increase in
1994 (to Rs 1.70), there have been no
changes in the tariff rate. With four
successive tariff hikes postponed by the
government, the pending increase is now
60 per cent of the 1994 tariff.
Clearly, the government subsequently
developed a reluctance to raise tariffs.
Regrettably, it has not been possible to
build an ongoing policy discussion around
the findings of the 1988 study, which
could still be used to predict acceptable
levels of tariff increase. This lack of vision
in influencing the policy debate over a
prolonged period appears to be a feature
of all the cases looked at.
but policy changes are possible
By contrast to the cases cited above
there are a number of instances in the
country where significant policy reforms
have been delivered without the
intervention of willingness-to-pay studies.
Hyderabad City
The Hyderabad Municipal Water
Supply and Sewerage Board
(HMWSSB) has successfully
implemented water tariff reviews and
has substantially improved its
financial performance today. The
major reasons for this outstanding
performance seem to be:
l establishment of an effective debate
between political leaders and
administrators   the Chief Minister is
the chairman of the HMWSSB
(although he is the sole political
representative);
l an acute water scarcity problem which
forced political leaders to recognize and
listen to the Boards concerns;
l pressure from the World Bank on the state
government to streamline its financial and
executive arms, in return for financial
assistance to overcome the crisis; and
l the capacity of the institution to respond
to these challenges and use the
opportunities created.
In this case financial and technical
imperatives drove the Board and the
political decision-makers to recognise the
need for tariff revisions based on an
assessment of the costs of service delivery,
without the need to refer to willingness-to-
pay studies. Consumers willingness to pay
higher rates to maintain the same level of
service which had been provided over the
years had to be assumed, as the cost of
providing the service was rising with little
prospect of alternative sources of financing
apart from cost-recovery. Had the Board
misjudged the willingness of its consumers
There are a
number of
instances in the
country where
significant policy
reforms have been
delivered without
the intervention of
willingness-to-pay
studies
hovering around 80 to 90 per cent) seems
to be that the scheme is delivering a  more
reliable and convenient service. Bottom-up
planning with participation from consumers
seems to have ensured that the consumers
recognise the value of the service provided
and are confident that they are being
charged a realistic price for it.
Conclusions
There is plenty of evidence, both direct
and indirect, to show that rural and urban
India is prepared to pay more for reliable,
safe and adequate water supply and
sanitation services. There is also evidence
that if suppliers can set tariffs at reasonable
levels based on real costs, consumers will
respond positively to tariff increases to
secure the required levels of service.
So, do policy makers in the drinking
water and sanitation sectors need to resort
to willingness-to-pay studies in order to
guide policy decisions? Clearly, such
studies provide information which could
help in technical planning and link
investment decisions with pricing policies.
However, the evidence to date indicates
that factors other than the existence of a
thorough contingent valuation survey may
play a more important role in pushing
through policy and pricing reforms.
Ironically, the conditions which would
seem to promote effective linkages
between willingness-to-pay research and
policy changes are probably those which
ensure that investments in detailed
research will not in fact be required. Thus,
for example, we can see from the Punjab
case study that political commitment at all
levels to the idea of tariff reform is
essential if study findings are to find a
place in policy planning. However, once
that political commitment is won, and a
climate of broad consensus and
consultation has been established, policy
makers may be content to be guided by
this would have become evident very
rapidly, but in fact there is little evidence of
dissatisfaction with the tariff and level of
service provided.
Rural Maharashtra
In three districts in Maharashtra  Nasik,
Jalgaon and Dhule  a new water supply
scheme covering 80 villages is drawing a lot
of attention. Supported by the UK
governments Department for International
Development (DFID), the scheme is
managed jointly by Village Water
Persons (VWPs) with support from
Water Management Units at the
district level. The Zilla Parishad
(District Administration) has taken
over the scheme in Jalgaon from
the contractors who built and ran
it for the first three months.
Villagers now manage the
elements of schemes lying within
individual villages through their
VWPs, while the district manages
overall
operations of
the scheme.
Between them,
the villages and
the district pay
half the
operating costs,
with a subsidy
from the state making up the shortfall.
Households pay an annual fee of Rs 70 for
a standpost connection and Rs 360 for a
private connection. Ultimately, the idea is
for the subsidy element to be phased out
and for the scheme to be financed entirely
at the local level.
Again, significant increases in tariff and
collection rates for this project have been
achieved without the need for willingness-
to-pay studies (although some studies are
being planned for the other districts). The
major reason why people are willing to pay
the increased tariff (with collection rates
Significant
increases in tariff
and collection
rates have been
achieved without
the need for
willingness-to-pay
studies
P
ho
to
gr
ap
h:
 G
uy
 S
tu
bb
s
technical and financial considerations as in
the Hyderabad case, leaving the level of
satisfaction of consumers to manifest itself
subsequently. Similarly, if tariff increases
have already been implemented without
significant increases in service levels, as in
the case of Dehradun, the findings of a
contingent valuation survey are unlikely to
convince consumers to accept further
proposed increases.
Lessons for the Future
What then is the future of willingness-
to-pay studies, in the present environment
where policy makers are beginning to
grapple with the need to improve financial
performance and ensure the long-term
sustainability of investments?  Given their
expense and the relative paucity of skills
currently available to carry them out,
should contingent valuation method
surveys be promoted over other, simpler
and less expensive ways of assessing the
potential to charge more for services?
One clear use of such studies is to
promote the idea of willingness to pay for
services. The combined information
provided by previous work in this area
represents a compelling argument for
policy makers to at least start to consider
the need for tariff reforms and policy
change. Clearly more could be done to
disseminate the information generated
from such studies. But for the future,
equally compelling information could be
generated from other sources. The Delhi
water management survey for example,
clearly shows that households in Delhi are
already paying a high price to cope with
poor quality service. This provides some
convincing evidence that consumers may
pay more for better services without the
complexity of a contingent valuation
method survey.
It may be true that in some circumstances
a detailed assessment of willingness to pay
is required to assess future strategies.
In Maharashtra, for example, the
government may now be ready to
consider widespread adoption of an
approach whereby consumers
manage and finance operation and
maintenance of more and more rural
water supply schemes.  In order to
assess the policy framework required
to support such an approach, and to
explore the potential to eliminate
subsidies entirely, it may be useful to
explore willingness to pay in a range
of districts, climatic and geographical
conditions, and for a range of levels
of service. Unlike the Hyderabad
case, this may be required because
the costs are so variable, and the
ability of the agency concerned to set
statewide tariffs on a simple cost-
recovery basis may be limited. More
flexible approaches may be required for
which more data would be needed.
However, it is still not clear whether a
complex and formal willingness-to-pay
study would be the most appropriate tool
to achieve this, nor even if the tool is
sufficient to address willingness-to-pay
within the complexities of multi-village
rural water supply schemes. Whatever tool
is used, until the commitment to policy
reform is secured, there may be little benefit
in carrying out the study.
Finally, willingness-to-pay studies can
never be a complete solution; even where
there is a real commitment to establishing
an understanding of the potential to
charge for services, studies must be linked
to technically-feasible investment options
and realistic approaches to introducing
tariff reforms. This means that any
research into consumers willingness to
pay for services should be linked to
concrete proposals to change the levels of
service provided, and the decision to
commission such studies should be the
product of an informed policy debate, not
Given their
expense and the
relative paucity of
skills currently
available to carry
them out, should
contingent
valuation method
surveys be
promoted over
other, simpler and
less expensive
ways of assessing
the potential to
charge more for
services?
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the trigger for such debate.  Crucially, those
who commission such studies must be
committed to the production of a high
quality product, with its attendant relatively
high cost, using experienced professionals
and providing a high level of supervision.
Good quality willingness-to-pay studies
have been and can be done in India but
their impact has been limited. There is a
need to disseminate the findings of such
studies more widely to inform the policy
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debate. In a few special cases, it may pay
to commission new studies. But this tool
should be used with care, and a greater
understanding of the potential and the
limitations of such approaches, along
with a consideration of other alternatives,
is essential before any policy maker,
supplier or consumer organisation
embarks on the costly exercise of
measuring willingness to pay with an
economists precision.
